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ABStRACt: Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis ac-
cording to which all perceptions are true . Although it seems very problematic and 
counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus’ 
claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious 
arguments . in the paper, i examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are 
true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through 
the following questions: (i) what kind of content do Epicurean perceptions have; 
(ii) what are the proper objects of perception; (iii) can we ascribe to such content 
truth and falsity? in the first part, i say something general about the thesis and point 
out some basic characteristics of perceptions due to which they serve as a criterion 
of truth . Next i try to show that the proper objects of perceptions are eidola and 
not external objects because only in that case can Epicurus maintain the truth of all 
perceptions, including illusions, hallucinations, dreams and other misperceptions . 
in the third part, i argue that such Epicurean perceptual content can be explained 
by the modern notion of non-conceptual content, which helps us to understand the 
special feature of Epicurean perceptions and also the important difference between 
perception and belief in Epicurean epistemology . in the final part, i discuss the no-
tion of alethes which i suggest implies that perception is “factive” .
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Epicurean epistemological theory, as well as other theories from the Hellen-
istic period, is motivated by two important questions: (i) whether knowledge 
is attainable at all; and (ii) if it is attainable, what are its foundations . Epicu-
rus’ answers to these questions show that he wants to defend the possibility 
of knowledge and to claim that the foundation of knowledge is our sensory 
experience . By claiming that knowledge is attained through the senses, Epi-
curus is placing himself on the side of empiricist tradition . However, his radi-
cal epistemological empiricism is combined with and even defended through 
atomistic theory, according to which the knowledge of the real structure of 
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the world goes beyond the scope of our experience and reveal the real ato-
mistic nature of things . Since atomism reveals that the true nature of things 
lies only on atomistic level, it opens a serious epistemological problem: a 
gap between the appearances, which are mere subjective experiences, and 
the objective reality explained in terms of different atomical configurations . 
Namely, appearances are not considered as genuine pieces of knowledge since 
they do not reveal the truth, but just the contrary, they misrepresent the real 
atomistic nature of things .
Epicurus and his followers wanted to save both kinds of knowledge and 
commit themselves to an epistemology that is strongly empiricist, claiming 
that knowledge and related concepts are grounded in experience . the overall 
epistemological project attempts to block possible skeptical inclinations and 
secure knowledge about the world by providing a standard or the criterion by 
which we can firmly determine the truth necessary for acquiring knowledge 
of reality . in fulfilling this task Epicurus aims to show that there is an ultimate 
and exclusive connection between perceptions and knowledge, where all per-
ceptions necessarily need to be taken as infallible criterion of truth . in other 
words, Epicurus proposes a specific epistemological framework in which he 
maintains that the possibility of any knowledge is guaranteed exclusively on 
the assumption of the incorrigibility of all perceptions .
in the paper, i shall examine the thesis according to which “all percep-
tions are true”, but my main focus is to analyze the content of Epicurean per-
ception through the following questions: (i) what kind of content Epicurean 
perceptions have; (ii) what are the proper objects of perception; (iii) can we 
ascribe to such content truth and falsity? in the first part i will say something 
general about the thesis and point out some basic characteristics of percep-
tions because of which they serve as the criterion of truth . Next i will try to 
show that the proper objects of perceptions are eidola and not external objects 
because only in this way Epicurus can maintain the truth of all perceptions, 
including illusions, hallucinations, dreams and other misperceptions .
in the third part i will argue that such Epicurean perceptual content can 
be explained by the modern notion of non-conceptual content, which help 
us to understand special feature of Epicurean perceptions and also important 
difference between perception and belief in Epicurean epistemology . in this 
part i will try to argue that the modern notion of nonconceptual content can 
be helpful for the clarification of the following issues in Epicurean epistemol-
ogy: (i) for the specification of the Epicurean content and its objects; (ii) for 
the explanation of the difference between perception and belief; (iii) for the 
understanding of the truthfulness that is ascribed to the content . in the final 
part, i will discuss the notion of alethes, which i suggest imply that perception 
is “factive” .
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I.
tradition before Epicurus recognizes two main sources for knowledge about 
the world: sense perception and reason1 . Epicurus puts himself on the side of 
empiricist, insisting that all knowledge must proceed from sense experience, 
since perceptions provide primal cognitive contact with the external world . 
the thesis about perceptual incorrigibility becomes the cornerstone of his 
epistemology . the crucial question concerns the problem of the way Epicu-
rus develop his central thesis . We may begin the analysis of his position with 
the following argument, usually taken by scholars to be the major argument 
to indicate the supremacy of perception:
if you fight against all of your perceptions (aisthesein) you will not have a stand-
ard against which to refer even those judgments which you pronounce false . 
(KD XXiii, transl . Hicks)
this quote, although very short and concise, summarizes the core idea of 
Epicurean epistemology based on sense-perception as the criterion of truth, 
but more importantly, it also guides us towards specific arguments that reveal 
why Epicurus adopts very specific epistemological position . the quote un-
doubtly shows that Epicurus firmly takes sense perceptions to be the origin 
of any judging and discrimination between truth and falsehood and also indi-
rectly implies that we have to take all of them as true . However, our main task 
is here to explain the reasons Epicurus has for the claim that sense perceptions 
are the criterion of truth and furthermore, why he believes in the absolute 
veridicality of perception .
the second part of the quoted sentence indicates the possible answers 
to the posed questions . Epicurus straightforwardly asserts that unless we take 
all perceptions to be true, we are left without the possibility of judging or of 
distinguishing truth from falsehood . in other words, the conclusion of the 
argument Epicurus desires to defend is that knowledge is not possible unless 
all perceptions are true . the versions of this argument we find in several other 
sources, predominantly in the work of Cicero who in several different places 
reports that according to Epicurus unless all perceptions are true, knowledge 
is not attainable (Cicero, Luc . 25, 79) . it follows from this quite obviously 
that Epicurus’ aim is to show that there is an ultimate and exclusive connec-
tion between perceptions as the criterion and knowledge, such as that falsity 
of perceptions threatens the possibility of knowledge .
Possible reconstruction of the argument might be the following: if you 
want to claim that all perceptions are false, you need to have some criterion 
1 “Reason” is taken here in a very wide sense as a term that generally covers all sources of 
cognitive operations that basically excludes involvement of sense experience . 
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on the basis of which you will reject all perceptions as false . But that criterion 
must be perception itself given the widely accepted thesis among Hellenistic 
schools that all knowledge proceeds from perception (Striker 1996: 86) . And 
if they are all false you are left without criterion and cannot consistently 
maintain falsehood of all perceptions . the rejection of the claim that all per-
ceptions are false leaves open more plausible thesis that some perceptions are 
false and some are true, so that senses are sometimes mistaken but usually 
reliable . But this must be also rejected because we cannot ever rely on our 
senses if they deceive us only once . More importantly, we cannot claim that 
some perceptions are false and some true unless we have some certain crite-
rion and we have already seen that there is no other criterion than the percep-
tions . therefore, the option that remains is to claim that all perceptions are 
true or otherwise knowledge is unattainable .2
However, the acceptance of the thesis that all perceptions are true re-
quires deeper analysis of the perceptual mechanism and the way our senses 
are connected with the world . Here Epicurus’ epistemology becomes tightly 
connected with his physical explanation of the nature of the external world 
and its basic constituents, claiming that the physical process of perceiving 
must be grounded in the atomistic theory . Namely, given the fact that at-
oms are in constant motion Epicurus infers that macroscopic bodies are con-
stantly emitting atoms and next he asserts that specific sorts of emanations 
are responsible for the perceiving of objects . the process of perceiving occurs 
because appropriate emanations, i .e . streams of atoms, are impinging upon 
our sense organs producing in that way appearances of objects . these atomic 
outflows are specific to each sense organ so that every sense organ is receiving 
the appropriate sort of emanation . those sorts of emanation then cause five 
types of sensory sensations .
Another important characteristic of Epicurean perceptions is given by 
Diogenes in the following passage:
All sensation, he [Epicurus] says is irrational (alogos) and does not accommodate 
memory . For neither it is moved by itself, nor when moved by something else is 
it able to add or subtract anything . (Dl X .31, transl . lS)
Perceptions are alogoi because they are, as Diogenes reports, not self-
generated, they are always caused by something from the outside . Given this, 
we can say that perceptions are passive, since they originate only when stimu-
lated by external causes . Furthermore, Diogenes says that perceptions do not 
accommodate memory, which in fact probably means that perceptions are 
not capable of storing their reports somewhere since they are just passive 
2 For the similar versions of the argument see Striker (1996: 86–87), long and Sedley 
(lS) (1987: 83) .
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responses to the external causes and therefore they do not involve memory, 
which would require some sort of judgment, comparison or other cognitive 
processing of the original reports . From this it follows that perceptions in 
general are not capable of exercising any higher order cognitive process about 
what is presented to us, or as Diogenes reports, perceptions are not capable of 
adding or subtracting anything to the given report .
Passivity is an important characteristic because it is the basis for fur-
ther conclusion that perceptions cannot add or subtract anything in the re-
port they present since they just passively present the things acting upon our 
sense-organs . From this follows another crucial characteristic of perception, 
namely, that given its passivity, perception thus “constantly reports truly and 
grasps the existing object as it really is by nature”, as it is reported by Sextus 
(M viii .9) . in other words, perceptions are always true, since they passively 
register the things which act upon our sense organs and therefore accurately 
depict them as they are . therefore, this model of perception excludes the 
possibility of assessment or processing by perception itself, thus leaving no 
room for any error . this in the end guarantees their infallibility . According to 
Epicurus “falsehood and error are always located in the belief which we add” 
(Dl X .50) since belief is the process in which one starts to interpret, infer or 
classify perceptual reports and exactly that process is not error-free, opening 
thus a possibility for the falsity of beliefs .
this is the general framework of Epicurus’ well-known theory of efflu-
ences according to which the activity of the senses is explained through a con-
tact of the sense organ and an external stimulus impinging on it (Dl X .46–7) . 
Epicurus also takes it that the mind functions as the sixth sense organ on the 
basis of organ-stimulus pattern, besides its other functions, namely, reasoning 
and inferential processes (lucretius, DRN iv .722–822) . therefore, Epicurus 
applies the same explanation of the mechanism of perceiving for all sorts of 
perceptions: sensory perceptions and all cases of “mental perceptions” such 
as dreams, hallucinations, illusions, etc .3 the cases of mental perception are 
particularly important for Epicurus and his methodology since the truthful-
ness of all perceptions, including mental ones, is condicio sine qua non for the 
possibility of knowledge .
Epicurus’ account of the mechanism of vision, according to which per-
ception is a result of the impact of eidola on the sense organ and the internal, 
3 Epicurus starts from the assumption that the cases of mental perception share an im-
portant similarity with the usual cases of seeing external objects, namely that there is some-
thing, some outside object that is seen . lucretius says that insofar as “what we see with the 
mind is like what we see with the eye – it must come about in a like way” (lucretius, DRN 
iv .750–51, transl . lS) . in other words, the similarity implies that it is not possible to have a 
vision without having a vision of something since in each case we encounter something . 
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passive response of the sense organ, is supposed to grant that the content of 
perception is entirely determined by the external cause . Since all external 
objects are emanating eidola which preserve the same atomic configuration as 
the solid from which they are released they are exact replicas of the solid and 
thus are truly reporting the nature of the solid . two things are important to 
emphasize: first, given such mechanism of perceiving, it is obvious that the 
solid does not affect the sense organ directly, but via eidola, and second, it is 
important that eidola in an ideal situation preserve all the properties of the 
solid on the basis of which it is possible to maintain that perceptions correctly 
report the solid as it is . Epicurus writes:
And whatever impression (phantasian) we get by focusing (epibletikos)4 our 
thought or senses, whether of shape or of properties, that is the shape of the 
solid body, produced through the image’s concentrated succession or after-ef-
fect . (Dl X .50, transl . lS)
Within the internal mechanism of obtaining perceptions Epicurus rec-
ognizes two methods by which perception is produced after an external ob-
ject affect the organ, namely concentrated succession and remaining .5 the 
first one, concentrated succession (pyknoma tou eidolou) clearly indicates the 
continuous stream of eidola released from the surface of the solid and when 
the contact with the sense organ is made, perception is produced . As already 
emphasized, Epicurus maintains that no single eidolon can ever produce a 
perception but only a constant stream coming from the solid’s surface .
the common understanding of the second method is that it applies 
strictly to mental perceptions, obtained by the impact of the very fine eidola 
which, instead of impacting on the eye, penetrate straight through to the 
mind . (Bailey 1928: 414) What happens when such an eidolon impacts on 
the mind is elucidated by Furley who claims that such eidola passes through 
the mind, but leave some mark on the soul and that the “remaining effect” 
(egkataleimma) is “a pattern left behind as a memory of a previous sense-ex-
perience” (Furley 1971: 611) . the function of the remaining effect is prob-
ably to secure an explanation of the way memory works since Epicurus, to 
emphasize again, claims that not any perception is self-moved .
4 Focusing (epibole) of the sense organ and the mind when functioning as the sense organ 
is a response that is not volitional but an automatic, passive response and receiving of external 
stimuli that results in obtaining a perception (phantasia) . this idea can be traced in Furley 
who gives a definition of epibletikos as the “process by which the mind or the sense ‘get hold 
of ’ something” (Furley 1971: 661) . 
5 Although i take here that pyknoma and egkataleimma are two methods, it seems to me 
that this is perfectly compatible with further claim that as such they serve as justification of 
the existence of solids and the way memory works in terms of eidola residue . i owe this further 
clarification to a blind referee . 
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What is more important about the sentence in which Epicurus intro-
duces two methods of obtaining of perception is that it brings the condi-
tion of the truthfulness and explanation of the perception as the criterion of 
truth . Namely, Epicurus maintains that every perception produced by the 
two methods is true because it accurately corresponds to its cause and truly 
represents the shape and other properties of an object . Accuracy of the per-
ception is thus grounded in the two methods . this is so because Epicurus 
maintains that the eidola are identical replicas of the solid released from its 
surface and retains the same atomic arrangement as in the solid .
in order to stress the perfect correspondence between eidola and the solid 
Epicurus says about eidola that “their unity and continuity then results in the 
impression, and preserves their co-affection (sumpatheia) all the way from 
the object because of their uniform bombardment from it” (Dl X .50, transl . 
lS) . the co-affection or sympathy is a relation between the eidola themselves 
and the external object from which they are emitted and it plays a crucial role 
in securing the truthfulness of perceptions .6
to conclude, the main conditions for the truthfulness of perception are: 
(i) the direct response of the organ (epibole), (ii) external cause (eidola), to 
which we should add the third crucial thing, (iii) sympathy (sumpatheia), that 
is, the correspondence between eidola and the source from which the unity 
of perception arises, as we are told in Dl X .50 . it seems rather clear now that 
Epicurus aims to deny the distinction between true and false perception on 
the basis of identifying the content of perception with the external cause, 
since in that case perception is true because simply the truthfulness of percep-
tion consists in the exact correspondence between perception and its cause .
But now the question of the proper objects of perception comes at issue . 
Namely, when i see a tower, is it the object of my perception the tower itself 
or eidola released from it? For the normal cases of vision this question seems 
to be a nit picking, but it becomes important when cases of misperceptions 
are introduced . Namely, what about the cases when perceptions do not rep-
resent an actual state of affair, as in the case of seeing a tower as round or an 
oar in the water as bent, or even worse in the cases of “seeing” Centaurs or 
Scylla, and of dreams . if the truth of all perceptions should be understood in 
the sense of the “truth” as an exact correspondence between the content of 
6 this is the reason why we have a perception of “the single and continuous object”, 
because sympathy works as the condition that secures perceptual unity and immediate aware-
ness of an external object . the fact that in perception we are immediately aware of an external 
object is emphasized by Epicurus who claims that perception is “of the solid body” or even 
clearly in lucretius who maintains that “one thing in this matter which should not be thought 
puzzling is why, although the images which strike the eyes cannot be seen individually, the 
objects themselves are perceived” . (lucretius, DRN iv .256–8, transl . lS)
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perception and the external solids as the objects of perception, the examples 
set forth show that this is simply false and easily refute that interpretation of 
the truthfulness of perceptions .
What is clear from Epicurus’ theory is that he wants to preserve the in-
tuitive idea that our perception is always perception of external objects, such 
as towers or honey, and that such a perception is the one that is always true . 
in the ideal cases of perceiving the intuitive idea that the proper object of 
perception is an external solid, i .e . a tower, seems to be perfectly plausible and 
clearly emphasized by lucretius (DRN iv .258) that in the process of perceiv-
ing we never perceive the eidola but always an external solid . this aim clearly 
follows from Epicurus’ overall epistemological project that attempts to secure 
knowledge about the world by providing a standard by which knowledge can 
be gained . thus, in order for perceptions to play the role of the epistemic 
standard of that kind, it is necessary for them to reveal the truth about the ex-
ternal objects, e .g . towers, oars and the like, and to objectively represent their 
nature . However, perceptual content in order to be true in the cases of mis-
perceptions must also correspond to its external cause . So the question then 
is: if perceptions are true of external objects in the sense that they correspond 
to the external solid representing its properties, what are misperceptions true 
of? What are, then, the proper objects of perception?
II.
Plutarch’s report offers some elucidation, although we have to bear in mind 
that the following text is rather hostile criticism of Epicurean epistemology 
in which Plutarch tends to equate Epicurean position with the position of the 
Cyrenaic subjectivism . Plutarch writes the following:
For the school that asserts that when a round film (eidolon) impinges on us, or 
in another case a bent one, the imprint is truly received by the sense, but refuses 
to allow us to go further and affirm that the tower is round or that oar is bent, 
maintains the truth of its experiences and sense impressions, but will not admit 
that external objects correspond; and as surely as that other school must speak 
of “being horsed” and “walled”, but not of horse or wall, so this school of theirs 
is under the necessity of saying that the eye is rounded or be-angled, and not 
that the oar is bent or the tower round, for it is the film (eidolon) producing the 
effect in the eye that is bent, whereas the oar is not bent from which the film 
proceeded . (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1121 AB, transl . De lacy)
Here Plutarch refers to the fact that Epicureans are cautious when it 
comes to making judgments about external objects in circumstances where 
the judgment might turn out to be false . the two most usual examples of 
this are an oar appearing bent when half-submerged in water and a square 
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tower appearing round from a distance . in such circumstances the Epicureans 
according to Plutarch restrict themselves to judgments about the way eidola 
impact the eye so as to bring about the perception, which is the foundation of 
Plutarch’s criticism of Epicurean epistemology as being committed to a form 
of subjectivism, just as Cyrenaics are . leaving aside for a moment Plutarch’s 
criticism, let us concentrate on his interpretation of the Epicurean position . 
From Plutarch’s report it follows that the truthfulness of perceptions is guar-
anteed by the way perceptions are produced and therefore they can be true in 
regards to their objects only if the proper objects of perceptions are eidola .
in the case of a tower appearing round from a distance, eidolon that 
stimulate sense organ is in fact round and thus perceptions accurately report 
the cause in the moment it impinges on the eyes . that is to say they are not 
accurate of the tower itself, as an external solid, but accurate in respect of 
its immediate physical stimulus, the eidolon, which we can describe as “the 
eidolon of a far-off tower” . on the other hand, belief that tower is round as its 
object has a tower itself, and therefore is false, because it does not capture the 
real property of the object in question . in other words, it seems that in the 
case of perception the content is not expressed only by saying that it includes 
just the external solid and specific property, but also the distance and perspec-
tive at which perception is produced . As long and Sedley maintains:
So too, since the vision’s province is to report not actual bodily shape, but 
“shape at a distance”, we feel no conflict between the far-off and close-up views 
of the same square tower: naturally we expect a far-off tower to look different 
from a near-by tower, since they constitute different objects of sensation . (lS 
1987: 85)
therefore, according to Epicurus, the conflict in perceptions is just ap-
parent one, because perceptions in those cases have different objects, “a far-
off eidolon” and “close-up eidolon” . their contents thus truly report “no more 
nor less then it is given in perception” because perceptions are alogoi, that is, 
not capable of interpretation or inference and thus equally trustworthy in 
representing their objects . Everson (1990: 177) similarly argues that:
the objects of perception, then, to which the perceptions must accord if they 
are to be true, are not solid objects but the film of atoms which strikes the 
senses . therefore, it is only if the objects of perceptions are eidola rather than 
the solid object themselves that the claim that all perceptions are true could 
stand a chance of being plausible .
Plutarch’s report is often cited together with Sextus’ outline of Epicurus’ 
error-theory where Sextus presents the Epicurean position as follows:
Some people are deceived by the difference among impressions seeming to 
reach us from the same sense-object, for example a visible object, such that the 
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object appears to be of a different colour or shape, or altered in some other way . 
For they have supposed that, when impressions differ and conflict in this way, 
one of them must be true and the opposing false . this is simple-minded, and 
characteristic of those who are blind to the real nature of things . For it is not 
the whole solid body that is seen – to take the example of visible things – but 
the colour of the solid body . And of colour, some is right on the solid body, as 
in the case of things seen from close up or from a moderate distance, but some 
is outside the solid body and is objectively located in the space adjacent to it, 
as in the case of things seen from a great distance . this colour is altered in the 
intervening space, and takes on a peculiar shape . But the impression which it 
imparts corresponds to what is its own true objective state . (SE M vii .205–7, 
transl . lS)
Sextus’ report follows very closely Plutarch’s interpretation and support 
the reading according to which the proper objects of perceptions are eidola, 
and not external objects . As Sextus states, the difference between perceptions 
can be explained only if we take that in perception “it is not the whole solid 
body that is seen – to take the example of visible things – but the colour of 
the solid body” . in other words, this reading suggests that since every per-
ception has a different immediate cause, every perception in fact presents 
a different state of affairs . this means that the state of affairs does not refer 
exclusively to the external object as such and its real nature, but directly to 
eidola, which capture a richer, contextual presentation of a different state of 
affairs .7 in Everson’ view, Sextus’ report explains another important feature of 
perceptions, namely the fact that perceptions are mutually irrefutable (Ever-
son 1990: 176) .
it becomes clear that Epicurus can successfully reply and block the ar-
gument from conflicting appearances only if an explanation of the conflict 
between perceptions of different senses concerning the same property is pro-
vided, as in the case of an oar half-emerged in the water when perceived by 
sight and touch . in order to argue that such a conflict is apparent, as Everson 
maintains, “Epicurus’ point must be not merely that there are some objects 
which cannot be perceived by more than one sense but that there are no 
objects which more than one sense can perceive” (1990: 177) . therefore, by 
taking the eidola as the objects of perceptions, Epicurus secures a justification 
for the general claim that each sense discriminates its specific objects, because 
only specific type of atomic effluences is commensurable with each sense 
organ . in addition, in the case of the one and the same perceptual modality, 
7 this does not contradict with Sextus (M vii .207) where he says that “of color, some 
is on the solid body itself ”, since he continues saying that “in the case of things looked at 
close up or from a moderate distance, while some is outside the solid body, and exists in the 
neighboring locations” . 
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as in the case of seeing a tower from different distances, perceptions cannot 
refute each other simply because those two perceptions are not perceptions of 
the same state of affairs being produced by different physical stimuli .
this interpretation is also promising in explanation of the truthfulness 
of vision of non-existing objects, as in the example of orestes’ seeing the Fu-
ries, and other cases of hallucinations and dreams, namely the cases in which 
there is no external solid from which eidola are released . Sextus reports the 
following account of the truthfulness of orestes’ perception:
At any rate, in the case of orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensa-
tion, being affected by the eidola, was true, in that the eidola objectively existed; 
but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held false opinions . 
(SE M viii .63, transl . lS)
According to Sextus’ report, Epicurus in the case of all perceptions, in-
cluding hallucinations and dreams, appeals to the same explanation: the 
truthfulness of sense-perceptions is related to their immediate cause, i .e . 
the eidola . that is, in all cases the equal trustworthiness of perceptions is 
established on the fact that perceptions always accurately report the state of 
the impacting eidola . Even in the cases where eidola are in fact emitted from 
an underlying external solid, the proper object of perception is not a solid 
but eidola .
However, this reading is not without difficulties . one of the major ob-
jections is raised by Plutarch in the previously quoted passage where he ac-
cuses Epicureans of holding a form of subjectivism that leads to a skepticism 
regarding the knowledge of external world . According to Plutarch, the ex-
planation of the trustworthiness of perceptions by the eidola as their objects 
directly opens the problem of the way in which the representational content 
of perceptions can ever secure us with objective information about the exter-
nal world . Namely, perceptions in that case do not provide an epistemic link 
with the objective reality because their truthfulness refers only to themselves . 
in other words, just as in the Cyrenaic position, knowledge becomes limited 
only to knowledge of one’s internal and subjective awareness of being in a 
certain perceptual state . therefore, as Striker (1996: 90) points out, although 
the suggested reading of the eidola as the objects of perception is appealing 
because it smoothly solves the problem of perceptual conflict, the cost is too 
high – it leads to a total inconsistency of Epicurean position and the loss of 
knowledge of the external world .
Nevertheless, a closer examination of Plutarch’s argument shows that 
the identification of the Epicurean position with the form of subjectivism 
and skepticism seems rather unfair and not textually supported, which opens 
thus a possibility for a reply to Striker’s worry . So before we finally conclude 
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that the proper objects of perception are eidola, it is necessary to give an ac-
count of the way in which representational content of perception relates us to 
the external world . the commentators take that the main argument against 
Plutarch’s interpretation relies on the fact that Epicurean perceptions are not 
reports of internal mental awareness of a subject, but of external reality . tay-
lor (1980: 118) explains it in the following way:
For the sceptic’s starting point (and his finishing-point too, for that matter) 
is knowledge of one’s own perceptual states, “perceptual sweetening” etc ., 
whereas the Epicurean starts from direct acquaintance with the physical ob-
jects impinging on the senses . the sceptics declare insoluble the problem of 
justifying the inference from descriptions of perceptual states to statements 
about external objects . For the Epicurean, on the other hand, descriptions of 
perceptual states are already descriptions of a percipient in contact with the 
physical world .
Similarly, Glidden (1979: 305) argues that
by restricting one’s sensory self-awareness to the feelings of pleasure and pain, 
Epicurus made his materialism compatible with his foundationalist theory of 
knowledge, since the evidence of perceptual appearances (phantasiai) was not to 
be identified with the subject’s inner sensory states .
What follows from this is the fact that such an epistemology and the justi-
fication of the thesis that “all perceptions are true” is inseparable from ma-
terialism or, in the Epicurean case, from the atomistic theory . therefore, 
the crucial difference between Cyrenaics and Epicureans, as tsouna (1998: 
118–9) points out, is “that the knowledge of aisthesis is already knowledge of 
something physical with which perceiver is in contact, whereas in knowing 
pathe the perceiver is only in contact with himself ” .
i agree with Everson (1990: 180) who argues that it is mistaken to in-
fer that perceptual reports will not be about external solids if their objects 
are eidola, since eidola “are as external as anything else” . therefore, when 
eidola are coming from an external solid they do represent their cause, before 
all because they secure the same atomic arrangement as in the solid from 
which they are released . As we are already told in Dl X .50, this correspond-
ence is secured because of sympathy (sumpatheia) between eidola and the 
source from which they are released . Nevertheless, perceptions do differ in 
the amount of information they carry about the object and the role of the 
opining is to determine and interpret the relevant information about certain 
object . in the case of perceptions of a tower seen from a distant and close-up 
view, perceptions are causally related to a tower but they are not informative 
in the same way about it . this does not mean that they are not telling the 
truth about it, but again, the truthfulness of those perceptions refers to two 
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different contents: a) “perceiving of a round tower from this position” and 
b) “perceiving of a square tower from this position” . Again, it is not a job of 
perception to infer that the real nature of a tower, because perceptions, just 
like photographs give us evidence of external reality8 .
Perception thus does bear a relation to the external world and it has con-
tent that is factive and informative about the world . in that way perception of 
the tower, although having eidola as its object, nevertheless is about the tower, 
just like belief . However, i want to argue that the difference between percep-
tion and beliefs consists in the fact that their specific contents are different . 
So in the case of a tower seen from a far, it seems that the content of percep-
tion have to be different since it captures the distance, the place from which a 
tower is observed, namely, the pure fact that it is seen from a distance . Exactly 
this is missing in the belief that the tower is round . in order to elucidate the 
difference between the contents, i will introduce the notion of nonconcep-
tual content in order to specify the special feature of perceptual content in 
contrast to content of belief which is conceptual .
III.
i believe that that Epicurean perceptual content might be interpreted as a 
part of a larger framework fixed around the debate about the notion of “non-
conceptual content” . Namely, the biggest problem i find in understanding 
Epicurean texts is the difference between the contents of perception and be-
lief and no satisfactory explanation is offered so far . therefore, the motiva-
tion for introducing the idea of nonconceptual perceptual content in modern 
epistemology lies in an aspiration to explain the intuition that there is some-
thing intrinsically different between perceptual content on the one side and 
perceptual beliefs on the other, and that that difference follows from the fact 
that perception is in some sense independent from belief .
Namely, one thing about perception that seems to be uncontroversial 
is that perception, just like belief, represents the world to be a certain way 
which is enough to consider it as having a content . However, the question of 
dispute is whether the content of perception is of the same kind or structure 
as that of belief . Usually it is taken that “the representational content of per-
ceptual experience has to be given by a proposition, or set of propositions, 
which specifies the way the experience represents the world to be” (Peacocke 
1983: 5) . this could mean that perception of some thing x, as F (for example, 
perceiving an apple as red) has to be given in the propositional form “that x 
8 Photography analogy servers only to illustrate the point that perception faithfully 
records external reality . Further interpretation of the “recorded material” belongs to the higher 
operations of mind, namely epilogismos together with the usage preconceptions . 
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is F”, because of which perception becomes dependent upon the perceiver’s 
ability to employ conceptual capacities . Form this it follows that the content 
of perception understood in that way is then determined by the concepts 
“x” and “F”, that is, we could not see that an apple is red unless we have the 
concepts “apple” and “red” . However, advocates of nonconceptualist content 
argue that although perceptions inform us about the world and thus certainly 
have representational content just like beliefs, the content of perception differ 
from the content of belief and need not be characterized as conceptual . they 
claim that we should be cautious in specifying the content of such representa-
tions as purely propositional and conceptual because it will appear to be too 
restrictive for the content of perception . to put it simply, the question to be 
answered is whether perceptual representation of the world is conceptualized, 
that is, whether seeing a certain thing as having a triangular shape requires 
that one has the concept of triangularity .
in the literature various arguments are offered to express the difference 
between the representational content of perception and belief and some aim 
to show that perception is independent from being conceptualized . For the 
purposes of this work let us focus on what seem to be the two main argu-
ments: the richness argument and the fine-grained argument .9 According to 
the richness argument the content of perceptual experience carries much more 
information about the objects in the external world, the properties they have 
and the relations between them than does the content of belief . My present 
perception of the view from a window carries so much information about dif-
ferent objects (such as the trees, the leaves, the tree bark, their shapes, colours, 
relations between them, between me and each object) and as such is full of 
information . it seems impossible that in order to have that representation it is 
needed to have all those concepts for each thing represented (objects, proper-
ties, relations and so on) .
the fine-grained argument is usually explained through the example 
that we can perceive and distinguish many more colour shades than we have 
concepts for . For example, i can experience many different shades of red, 
without having a specific concept of each shade and therefore, this implies 
that the content of perception has a specific feature, namely fineness of grain, 
in contrast to beliefs, and thus implies a resistance to calling it conceptual . 
9 Usually the fine-grain argument and the richness argument are not recognized as two 
different arguments . i follow the suggestion of Siegel (2010) because it seems that by distin-
guishing them two different features of perception are better illustrated . other authors add 
some other arguments, such as the continuity argument according to which the fact that 
humans share the same representational content with lower animals indicates that the shared 
content must be non-conceptual since lower animals do not have concepts and yet have repre-
sentational content . i did not particularly concentrate on that one because it is not so relevant 
for understanding Epicurean content . 
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So, both arguments show that although there is something similar between 
perception and belief, namely that they represent the world and thus have 
content, in some respect their contents are rather different . the difference in-
dicated in both of them is nicely illustrated by Dretske (203: 26) who says:
Suppose a cup has coffee in it, and we want to communicate this piece of in-
formation . if i simply tell you, “the cup has coffee in it”, this (acoustic) signal 
carries the information that the cup has coffee in digital form . No more specific 
information is supplied about the cup (or the coffee) than that there is some 
coffee in the cup . you are not told how much coffee there is in the cup, how 
large the cup is, how dark the coffee is, what the shape and orientation of the 
cup are, and so on . if, on the other hand, i photograph the scene and show you 
the picture, the information that the cup has coffee in it is conveyed in analog 
form . the picture tells you that there is some coffee in the cup by telling you, 
roughly, how much coffee is in the cup, the shape, size, and color of the cup, 
and so on .
this passage presents Dretske’s famous distinction between two sorts of in-
formation, digital and analog . the main difference is that information that 
x is F in analog form has richer and finer content, whereas information in 
digital form carries just some of the information that is already present in 
analog form and sorted out from it . From this Dretske concludes that per-
ceptual experience, i .e . sensory presentation, always comes in analog form, 
and “until information has been extracted from this sensory structure (digitali-
zation), nothing corresponding to recognition, classification, identification, 
or judgment has occurred – nothing, that is, of any conceptual or cognitive 
significance” (2003: 38) . the process of perceiving, such as seeing, hearing 
or smelling, is the process in which we simply receive sensory information 
about x as F without being able to conceptually understand that x is F . the 
sensory system, says Dretske is like the postal system: it delivers information 
by means of a causal mechanism, just like a thermometer or camera .
Similarly to Dretske, Evans grounds his explanation of non-conceptual 
content and its distinctive informational character on the analogy with pho-
tography . on the grounds of the analogy, Evans (1982: 125) emphasizes as a 
relevant characteristic of such content that it is causally dependent upon the 
objects it represents, in the sense that “the properties that figure in the con-
tent of its output are (to a degree determined by the accuracy of the mecha-
nism) the properties possessed by the objects which are the input to it” . in 
other words, the content of perception understood as an informational state 
is fixed by the objects that information is about in such a way that informa-
tional content that x is F would not occur if x were not F .
From this, rather oversimplified explanation of the representational 
character of perception for the present purposes, we can extract three main 
features on the grounds of which such content can be characterized as non-
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conceptual: (i) the content of perception is replete and has fineness of grain 
in the sense that perceptual representation carries information about proper-
ties, but also about position, relations of objects presented to other objects 
and to the perceiver; (ii) the representational content of perception causally 
depends upon the objects it represents; (iii) due to the fact that perception 
cannot carry information that x is F unless x is F, perceptual content has spe-
cific primitive certainty and is veridical by definition (Stalnaker 2003) . the 
veridicality condition requires special attention .
What lies behind the third condition is the naturalistic and common-
sense intuition according to which it seems natural to say that the content of 
perception usually accurately represents how things are in the world because 
it is determined by its external cause . Explained in such a way perception 
is characterized primarily as the matter of a relation between the perceiver 
and the object perceived . However, this does not imply that in modern dis-
cussion all representational contents are veridical . Perceptual error is usu-
ally understood as the case in which the content of representation does not 
correspond with the way things actually are in the world, as in the case of 
illusions and hallucinations . Since in those cases representational content 
fails to correspond with the way things really are, the modern discussion is 
concerned with securing the so-called “accuracy conditions” under which 
perceptual content is veridical . So in what sense is the nonconceptual con-
tent veridical?
this question is largely debatable but i want to concentrate on the for-
mulation of veridicality of the non-conceptual content that seems to be use-
ful for elucidating the Epicurean content of perception . What appears to be 
crucial for the explanation of the primitive certainty of informational content 
is the fact that in order to properly grasp it, it is necessary to take into con-
sideration the relevant features of information, namely its repleteness and 
fineness of grain . Given this, the notion of veridicality thus will include an 
extensive understanding of the counterfactual supporting evidence (namely, 
that the informational content would have been different if the information 
were different) in the way that will make perceptual content more sensitive 
to the possible different states of the environment . tye (2003: 79) illustrates 
this point with the following example:
the coin looks round . it also looks tilted – some parts of its facing surface look 
nearer than other parts of that surface . the experience thus represents the coin 
as round, as tilted, and so forth . the coin held perpendicular to the line of 
sight does not look tilted, however . therefore, an immediate representational 
difference exists between the two cases . Furthermore, the tilted coin also looks 
elliptical from the given viewing position . Here the represented feature is that 
of having a shape that would be occluded by an ellipse placed in a plane perpen-
dicular to the line of sight . Again the representational is nonconceptual . And 
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again, no illusion is present . the experience is veridical on all levels: the facing 
surface of the coin really is elliptical from here; the coin really is circular .
if we go back to the initial characterization of the veridicality condition 
which says that perception cannot carry information that x is F unless x is F, 
in the case of perceiving the coin as elliptical veridicality is guaranteed only if 
the main features of the information are considered: the causal trace and the 
proper relation between perceiver and the object perceived . to put it differ-
ently, we intuitively take that the most plausible way to explain the fact that i 
perceive something red is that there must be something red that is perceived . 
the commonsensical way to explain the nature of perceptual content is to say 
that it is determined by its cause because there is a causal connection between 
the perceiver and the perceived object . So veridical perception is the one in 
which there is always an object that matches the content of perception and 
falsidical if there is not .
After the veridicality feature is explained in more details, we can con-
clude by saying that since (i), (ii) and (iii) features of perception cannot be 
accommodated by conceptual content of judgment it follows that they are 
two distinct sorts of contents: non-conceptual content of perception in the 
judgment is interpreted, identified and structured under the concepts, how-
ever with an inevitable loss of information . So how does this help us to un-
derstand Epicurean content and truthfulness of perceptions? in what follows 
i will try to show that Epicurean perceptual content meets all of the three 
features sketched above .
We can start with the fact that in explanation of Epicurus’ account of 
the truthfulness of perception commentators often employ the strategy of 
illustrating the perceptual system as a recording device or a camera or by the 
analogy of photography, as in the case of the information delivery systems . So 
taylor (1980: 119–120) writes:
the analogy of the camera is, though anachronistic, quite an apt expression of 
the Epicurean view . their thought seems to have been that, like the camera, 
aisthesis cannot lie, since aisthesis puts no construction on what it “sees” nor 
compares it with what it remembers (Dl, loc . cit . mnēmēs oudemias dektikē), 
but, like the camera, merely records what is before it . But it is precisely this pas-
sivity in the face of stimulation which gives aisthesis its evidential value .
What does this tell us about the content of perception and the way it should 
be specified? one crucial part of the analogy with the camera is the fact 
that perception “is irrational and does not accommodate memory” because 
“neither is it moved by itself, nor when moved by something else is it able to 
add or subtract anything” (Dl X .32, transl . lS) . in other words, perceptual 
content originates as a totally passive response to external stimuli that is not 
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capable of making any intervention on the stimuli . So perception gathers 
information in the same way as the informational systems described by Dret-
ske and Evans, being causally dependent upon the objects it presents . in the 
case of Epicurean perceptions those objects, as we have seen, are eidola and 
therefore for a perceptual content to be veridical in the Epicurean case means 
that the representational content has to accord with the information carried 
by the eidola . that is, in the case of seeing the tower as round, the content 
of perception is trustworthy in spite of the fact that the tower itself is square 
because it accurately represents state of affairs, that is, the information about 
objects in the world carried by the eidola . But what is in fact the informa-
tion carried by the eidola? Does the content of perception refer to the state 
of affairs that can be captured and exhausted by saying only that the tower is 
round? obviously not .
in explaining the accuracy and the reliability of perception the content of 
perception refers to the state of affairs that includes roundness as a property, 
and the tower to which the property is ascribed, but also the relation between 
the perceiver and the object perceived, that is, the point of view from which 
the tower is observed . Having that in mind, the content of perception in the 
case of perceiving the tower as round has different content from the one that 
represents the tower as square, but the crucial point is that the contents are 
not conflicted . they are not in conflict simply because they are about differ-
ent states of affairs although are causally connected with the same object, the 
tower . However, the causal history of information includes much more than 
the object and the relevant property of the object in question as expressed in 
a proposition “that the tower is round” . We can say that both perceptions of 
the tower are truthful representations of states of affairs but only because the 
content of perception is expanded in order to include all information carried 
by eidola . thus the content of Epicurean perception necessarily includes ob-
jects, properties and relations, just as a photograph does, as Dretske claims, 
which indicates that the representational content of Epicurean perception is 
rich and replete in a different way than beliefs are, as pointed out in the first 
feature of nonconceptual content . So, let us see how the Epicurean content 
meets the veridicality condition .
Specific feature of Epicurean epistemology is that it provides objects of 
perception, i .e . eidola, that always matches perceptual content and therefore 
make perceptions always veridical . in that sense perception always correctly 
inform us about the way things are in the world, but it is up to perceiver to 
cautiously form beliefs from perceptual report . Exactly because of this condi-
tion, namely because eidola and not the external solids are proper objects of 
perception, it is possible to explain the truthfulness of all perceptions . Simi-
larly, in the case of hallucinations and all other cases which are normally un-
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derstood as misperceptions, the content of perception will be veridical since 
all cases of perception have to match with eidola as their objects . this reflects 
the way Epicurus’ epistemology is totally intertwined with his physics: the 
eidolic theory guarantees that perception cannot but accord with its objects 
and therefore perceptions are always true .
What particularly allows proposed interpretation of the content of per-
ception in Epicurean epistemology is the fact that perception totally passively 
receives and delivers information, making no room for any intervention or 
interpretation of the information received . this point allows an explanation 
of the difference between perception and belief and their contents in the 
way that perceptual is nonconceptual . Perception is, says Epicurus, alogos 
and does not accommodate memory, which i take to rather strongly indicate 
that perception is a cognitive ability that does not consist in exercising any 
conceptualization . this means that perception cannot recognize or interpret 
or structure information in the form of “that tower is round” because being 
able to do that necessarily involves sorting out of the input and employing 
concepts of “tower” and “roundness” .10 that goes beyond perceptual abil-
ity because it includes at least the ability to recognize an object as such and 
such and to conjoin it with the right preconception stored in a memory . So, 
in line with Dretske’s suggestion, the Epicurean representational content of 
perception can be characterized as analog, which in the process of judgment 
becomes structured and conceptualized or digital .
Finally, if we accept that Epicurean perceptual content should be un-
derstood as non-conceptual, can we ascribe truth to such content? So, the 
last question i want to pose is the following: what does it mean to say that 
such content of perception is true and how should we understand the term 
alethes?
IV.
Some scholars suggest that the solution for the problem of truthfulness is to 
be found in a different interpretation of “true” (alethes) in the thesis that “all 
perceptions are true”, namely in the sense of “real” . the main evidence for 
this reading are the passages from Sextus M viii .9, where he says that for 
Epicurus there is no difference between saying that a thing is “true” and “real” 
and the passage Dl X .32 where Diogenes reports the Epicurean position say-
ing that “the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses . 
But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain” (transl . Hicks) . Also 
10 it is important to stress again that perception never tells us that X is tower, but only 
that there is something external that stimulates our sense organ . 
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in the last sentence of Diogenes’ passage “truthfulness” of perceptions in the 
case of madmen and in dreams is elucidated by the fact that in those cases 
some movement occurs, that is to say that misperceptions are just as real as 
normal perceptions in as much as they show that something appears to us . 
the “realistic” reading is here supported particularly by the fact that alethes of 
misperception is contrasted and opposed to “what does not exist” (to me on) 
implying that alethes is then synonymous to “exist” (to on) .
the main motivation for this reading is to solve the difficulties and the 
absurdity that come out of the claim that all perceptions are equal in trust-
worthiness which seems to be simply false because of many cases of per-
ceptual error . By taking alethes as “real” it becomes more plausible to claim 
first, that the illusory perceptions of a madman and dream visions are “true”, 
that is, “real” events in one’s perceptual sensory organs; second, the “realistic” 
reading fits better with the comparison of perceptions with pain and pleasure, 
as a kind of states which cannot be characterized as “true” having no content 
to which the truthfulness in a propositional sense can be ascribed; and finally 
the third, namely that the comparison with the bodily states accords with the 
characterization of perception as alogos, because of which perception, just 
like a headache, cannot be evaluated as true or false, having no propositional 
content (long 1971, Rist 1972, o’Keefe 2010) . therefore, according to this 
reading only beliefs can be taken as true and false simpliciter, while perceptual 
“truthfulness” consist only in being a real event, i .e . the sense organ being 
stimulated by real, existing eidola .
the absurdity of the “realistic” view Everson (1990: 167) explains by 
saying that “the contrast between perceptions and beliefs will be that whereas 
all perceptions are real (or involve awareness of something real), some beliefs 
are real while others are not (or do not involve awareness of something real)” . 
Also, the “realistic” reading, as Striker (1996: 81) points out,
goes against the entire tradition – not just hostile authors like Cicero and Plu-
tarch, but also lucretius, and Sextus, who seems to be rather impartial in this 
case, take Epicurus to be asserting something about the truth as opposed to fal-
sity of our impressions, rather than about “truth” as opposed to nonexistence .
And it is not ad hominem to take very seriously the fact that the authors with-
out exceptions ascribe to Epicurus this odd, absurd and almost indefensible 
epistemological thesis according to which he treats the figments of madmen, 
dreaming and all other cases of misperception as true . therefore, the second, 
“propositional” reading consists in preserving the epistemological relevance 
of the thesis about perceptual incorrigibility, by establishing perceptions as 
the kind of things that have a content to which the notion of truth is applica-
ble . Speaking in the language of contemporary epistemology, Epicurean per-
ceptions can be characterized as having a content because they without doubt 
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concerns the external world and “to say that any state has content is just to say 
that it represents the world as being a certain way” (Crane 1992: 139) .
Striker and Everson argue that there is in fact no difficulty in regard-
ing sense-perceptions as “true” in the usual, propositional sense of the word, 
offering a different, propositional reading of alethes in the sense of true sim-
pliciter . Everson (1990: 169) claims that “perceptions, like propositions, are 
concerned with states of affairs in the world” so we should accept that “the 
proper way to describe perceptions is by reference to their content proposi-
tionally expressed” . Striker (1990: 90) maintains that the incorrigibility of 
perceptions should be understood as the claim that “all propositions express-
ing no more nor less than the content of a given sense impressions are true” .
However, propositional reading is not without difficulties itself . First, 
given that Epicurean process of perceiving is based on atomistic theory, per-
ception is reduced to atomical effluences passively received by a sense organ 
and as such it hardly leaves any room for ascribing propositional truthfulness 
to perception . Moreover, we have learned that perceptions are alogoi, that is, 
totally incapable of any intervention in the content of what they represent 
because of which perception, just like a headache, cannot be evaluated as 
true or false, having no propositional content . Next, Epicurus distinguishes 
between two kinds of movements that happens in the act of perceiving and 
judging (Dl X .51) where perception is always alethes and irrefutable, unlike 
belief which can be true or false . it seems that this difference is captured only 
if perceptions and beliefs are characterized differently: perception as being 
always alethes, in contrast to beliefs which are eligible for evaluating as true or 
false . the claim that alethes is used in the same sense for both perceptions and 
beliefs simply disregard this important distinction and leads to an uncom-
fortable consequence that perception, just like beliefs, thus can be false .
Finally, the biggest worry for propositional reading is missing of the tex-
tual support . in Epicurean epistemology we cannot find any textual evidence 
for a clear distinction between perceptions (aistheseis) and something like 
perceptual propositions or phantasiai as it is later introduced in Stoic episte-
mology . Epistemologically the distinction between aisthesis and phantasia is 
important because strictly speaking only phantasia, having propositional con-
tent, can be evaluated as true or false . in the relevant passage where Epicurus 
is talking about veridicality of all perceptions, he claims that alleged mis-
perceptions resemble to “the things we call existent (ousi) and true (alethesi)” 
(Dl X .50), obviously referring to the objects in the external world as alethesi 
and not perceptual propositions . Similarly, Sextus reports Epicurus’ position 
saying that “Epicurus spoke of all perceptible things (aistheta) as true and as 
beings (onta)” (M viii .9) . it seems then, that textual evidence speaks against 
propositional reading, and as such it should be abandoned . Given that both 
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tradional intrepretaion of alethes face some serious problems, it is necessary 
to look for another option .
Recently, the third possible interpretation of alethes is offered by Katja 
vogt (ms) which seems to be rather promising since it takes over those parts 
of the two offered readings which are at best supported by the evidence . 
vogt builds her reading on a comparison between Epicurean perception and 
knowledge . Namely, knowledge is an epistemological state which is always 
true and simply cannot be false . As vogt (ms) explains, “one cannot know 
something that is not the case: what is known is a fact . this idea is today 
sometimes expressed as the thesis that the verb ‘to know’ is factive” . Epicu-
rean perception is analogous to knowledge exactly in this respect: there are 
pieces which cannot be false and as such, vogt suggests, should be understand 
as factive in order to avoid confusion of ascribing truthfulness to something 
that is impossible to refute . therefore, the thesis that perception is alethes 
should be understood as “all perceptions are factive” . vogt (ms) explains her 
position in the following way:
Every sense-perception is caused by something that exists, and it is of that which 
causes it . this is, i submit, precisely the thought that sense-perception is factive . 
A sense perception is generated by some atomic image, and it is this atomic im-
age that is perceived .
Although i do not share vogt’s conclusion that the atomic image is per-
ceived, i find her interpretation of alethes as factive to be compatible with 
my suggestion to take Epicurean perceptual content as nonconceptual . As 
i previously argued the main reason for this is because perceptual content is 
of a different kind than of beliefs . therefore, it is illegitimate to treat truth-
fulness of perception in the same way as of beliefs, as it was the case in the 
propositional reading . However, this does not imply that perception do not 
have any epistemologically relevant content as the proponents of the realistic 
reading maintain .
to say that perception is factive, as i understand it, means that there 
is the constant and regular correlation between a perceptual report and the 
reality of what is reported . in other words, given the mechanism of perceiv-
ing, perception always perfectly accords with its cause and thus cannot be 
mistaken in representing it . Perceptions indeed have content, but it is a raw 
material which cannot be false since it is a mere response of a sense organ on 
the impact from the outside, namely eidola . Because eidola are true and secure 
reports of external objects, incorrigibility of all perceptions is guaranteed . in 
that sense perception is different from opinion, and vogt is right in insisting 
that alethes cannot be applied in the same way to those intrinsically different 
cognitive states .
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therefore, the advantage of the “factive” reading is that it preserves the 
epistemological relevance of the claim that “all perceptions are true” by tak-
ing that the perceptual truth is the systematic correspondence between per-
ception and the object it represents, which follows from the fact that every 
perception always has a real, external cause . And this is exactly the way Sextus 
reports Epicurean position saying that
the Epicureans say, an appearance is said to be true whenever it comes about 
from a real thing and in accordance with just that real thing, and every appear-
ance is produced from a real thing that appears and in accordance with the very 
thing that appears, necessarily every appearance is true . (M vii .205, transl . 
Bett)
V.
to conclude, the difference between the contents of perception and beliefs 
in representation of the world consists in the fact that perception represents 
the world in a nonconceptual way, serving as a tribunal of the way things are 
passively given in perception without any intervention upon stimuli . i believe 
that taken this way the content of perception can be characterized as purely 
factual . Exactly the feature of passivity and givenness enables perception to 
serve as the foundation of cognition, to be self-evident and the criterion of 
truth . Namely in perceiving subject is not able to intervene in the process, 
but is passively stimulated from outside, which in the end guarantees validity 
of all perceptions . in Epicurean terms, the eidolic theory excludes a possibil-
ity of any intervention in perceptual content, for which i argued, is the start-
ing point for reading that such content is nonconceptual .
Since perceptions are impossible to refute, they sharply differ from be-
liefs which can be false . Given that perceptions in Epicurean epistemology 
cannot be false it seems plausible to assume that truth and falsity cannot be 
ascribed to perceptions and beliefs in the same sense . therefore, i accept a 
new proposal for the interpretation of alethes as factive .
From this we can infer that the beliefs will be true if they correctly ex-
tract and structure information delivered through the sensory organs by ap-
plying correct concepts in order to classify, structure and express the content 
of perception . the concepts that are applied are Epicurean preconceptions . 
this reading i believe serves as a good ground for understanding why pre-
conceptions are necessary as the second criterion of truth . Namely, precon-
ceptions originate from a memory of what is often perceived (Dl X .33) and 
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enable us to articulate what we see in the form of judgment and as such are 
necessary epistemological tool for testing truth and falsehood together with 
perceptions .11
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